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Price Cutting in Liability
Insurance Markets*

I. Introduction

The commercial general liability (GL) insurance
market (which includes product liability insurance) experienced sharp increases in premium
rates, limited availability of coverage, and modi-

fications in coverage terms during the mid-1980s.
This "crisis" or "hard market" was preceded by
a "soft market" with declining premium rates
and deteriorating insurer financial results in the

early 1980s. The hard market coincided with
large upward revisions in reported claim liabilities for GL policies sold in prior years. Consider-

able debate has addressed whether this volatility
in insurance prices and availability can be fully
explained by changes in discounted expected
costs of providing coverage, and, if not, possible
causes of variation.

Many industry analysts believe that the early
1980s soft market for GL insurance represented
a particularly severe episode of price cutting to
preserve market share. According to this view,
price cutting resulted in premium rates that were
* This research was sponsored by a grant from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. An earlier
version was presented at the 1991 meeting of the American

Law and Economics Association. We thank Roy Brooks,
Robert Klein, Greg Niehaus, Rodney Roenfeldt, Douglas Diamond (the editor), and an anonymous referee for helpful

This article analyzes alleged underpricing of
general liability insurance prior to the mid1980s liability insurance "crisis." The
theoretical analysis considers whether moral
hazard and/or heterogeneous information for
forecasting claim costs
can cause some firms
to price too low and depress other firms'
prices. Cross-sectional
analysis of insurer loss
forecast revisions
(which should be
greater for firms with
low prices caused by
moral hazard or heterogeneous information)
and premium growth
provides evidence consistent with low pricing
due to moral hazard
but not heterogeneous
information. The evidence also implies that
shifts in the loss distribution produced large
industrywide forecast
errors.
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inadequate given information available at the time policies were sold.
Attendant operating losses contributed to the subsequent hard mar-

ket.' The largest property-liability insurer insolvencies in the mid1980s are asserted to have been caused by deliberate or irresponsible

underpricing of GL insurance during the early 1980s. These insurers

also are alleged to have deliberately underreported claim liabilities and
used reinsurance to hide underpricing and capital inadequacy prior to
failure (U.S. House of Representatives 1990).2
Prior research has focused on causes of the mid-1980s price increases. Possible explanations include the effects on discounted ex-

pected costs of declining interest rates and increases in the expected
value and variance of claim cost distributions (Clarke et al. 1988; Harrington 1988). Several studies consider whether unexpected increases

in claim liabilities for prior years' policies, in conjunction with capital
adjustment costs, led to large backward shifts in short-run supply

(Winter 1988, 1991a; Gron 1989, 1992; Cummins and Danzon 1991).
Price behavior prior to the mid-1980s increases, or in other soft market

periods that have preceded abrupt price increases, has received little
attention. Apart from possible fluctuations due to capital adjustment

costs (Winter 1988, 1991a; Gron 1989, 1992), there has been no analysis
of whether competition could cause prices in soft markets to fall below
levels needed ex ante to cover expected costs and ensure solvency.3.

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of alleged
underpricing of GL insurance during the early 1980s. We explore theoretically whether competition among heterogeneous insurers can cause

prices to fall temporarily below costs. In our analysis, some firms may
price below cost because of moral hazard that results from limited
liability, risk-insensitive guaranty programs, and uninformed or unconcerned consumers. Firms also may price below cost due to heteroge-

neous information concerning future claim costs that results in low loss

forecasts relative to full-information conditional expectations. Loss
forecasting errors and consequent winner's curse effects may have
been especially likely during the early 1980s because of large changes
1. Industry analysts also commonly believe that prices in GL and other propertyliability lines are cyclical with periods of rate inadequacy followed by substantial premium increases and availability problems (e.g., Stewart 1984). Several studies provide
evidence that insurer operating results exhibit second-order autocorrelation that is consistent with a cycle (e.g., Cummins and Outreville 1987; Smith 1989).
2. The 1980s experience contributed to substantial changes in state solvency regulation, including the development of risk-based capital requirements, and it increased
pressure for federal regulation.
3. Using aggregate time-series data for property-liability insurance, Gron (1992) finds
little support for any influence of changes in capital on price changes during soft markets.

Winter's (1991a) empirical results using aggregate time-series data are inconsistent with
the predictions of capital shock models during the early (and mid-) 1980s. Winter (1991b)
provides an overview of capital shock explanations of fluctuations in price and availability.
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in the distribution of losses.4 In response to underpricing by some

firms, our analysis suggests that other firms may cut prices to preserve

market share and thus avoid loss of quasi rents from investments in
tangible and intangible capital. Thus, a subset of firms can cause prices
for other firms to fall below costs in the short run.5
Our empirical analysis employs cross-sectional data from the early
1980s to test whether moral hazard and/or heterogeneous information
contributed to differences in prices and growth rates among firms.
Thus, we assume that other firms' price responses to low prices due
to moral hazard or heterogeneous information do not eliminate price
variation. Price cutting by other firms would reduce price variation
and thus reduce the power of our tests. Since the ideal data on price
and quantity of business for homogeneous policies are not available,
we analyze two related variables: (1) loss forecast revisions and
(2) premium growth rates. A number of studies have analyzed multiline
loss forecast revisions ("loss reserve errors") for property-liability
insurers (Weiss 1985; Grace 1990; Petroni 1992). Our analysis is distinctive in using loss forecast revisions to measure price differences
and in analyzing the relationship between loss forecast revisions and
premium growth.
The moral hazard hypothesis predicts that firms with weak safety
incentives will charge low prices and grow more rapidly than firms
with higher target safety levels. The loss forecast revision for year t

measures the extent to which an insurer subsequently updates its forecast of losses for accidents that occurred in year t. Forecast revisions
will be influenced by unfavorable (or favorable) realizations in claim

costs compared to full-information conditional expectations when policies are sold. Forecast revisions will be inversely related to price,
assuming that firms that price low due to moral hazard deliberately
understate initial reported loss forecasts to hide inadequate prices from
regulators and other interested parties but that positive forecast revi-

sions become inevitable as paid claims accumulate.6 The percentage

4. McGee (1986) speculated that insurers with optimistic loss forecasts may cause
prices to fall below the level implied by industry average forecasts. Winter (1988, 1991b)
mentions the possibility of heterogeneous information and winner's curse effects.
5. Insurers that persisted in charging inadequate prices would either become insolvent
or increase price and limit supply. Prior work suggests that sharp reductions in insurer
capital could temporarily produce supra cost prices. While we do not analyze hard
markets, inadequate prices due to moral hazard or heterogeneous information could
contribute to erosion in capital and thus the severity of price increases in hard markets.
In any case, if prices tend to become inadequate in the short run, they would eventually
need to exceed costs in order for safer and better informed firms to make investments
that generate quasi rents and earn fair rates of return over time.
6. Loss reserve reporting involves substantial managerial discretion. Failed insurers
commonly have inadequate reported losses and loss reserves (see A.M. Best Co. 1991).
This problem was pronounced for GL insurance written in the early 1980s by insurers
that subsequently became insolvent (see U.S. House of Representatives 1990). Petroni
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growth in premiums (net of reinsurance) for year t should be positively

correlated with quantity growth (net of reinsurance) if firm-level de-

mand is elastic. Thus, premium growth should be greater for firms
that price low due to moral hazard and positively related to forecast

revisions, reflecting demand response to low prices.
The heterogeneous information hypothesis predicts that firms with
lower loss forecasts will charge lower prices and grow more rapidly

than firms with higher forecasts. If prices vary due to differences in
loss forecasts at the time of sale, less-informed firms should experience
relatively greater upward forecast revisions over time as information
accumulates. Hence, forecast revisions should again be inversely related to price; positively related to measures of poor information, such
as inexperience; and positively related to premium growth.
We estimate reduced-form equations for loss forecast revisions and
premium growth, including variables that measure propensity for low
pricing due to moral hazard and heterogeneous information. We also
estimate a structural model to test for a positive relation between premium growth and forecast revisions. Our results using GL insurance
data during 1980-82 provide evidence that is consistent with low pricing due to moral hazard and inconsistent with low pricing due to het-

erogeneous information. The specific findings are as follows: (1) fore-

cast revisions and premium growth were generally positively and

significantly related to the amount of liabilities ceded to reinsurers,
consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis that reinsurance was used
to conceal low prices and excessive growth; (2) mutual insurers generally had significantly lower forecast revisions and premium growth
than stock insurers, consistent with mutuals being less prone to low
pricing due to moral hazard; (3) measures of experience generally were
not significantly related to both forecast revisions and premium

growth, contrary to the heterogeneous information hypothesis; and
(4) premium growth was positively and significantly related to forecast

revisions, consistent with an inverse relation between forecast revisions and prices. We also provide evidence of large unfavorable realizations in losses that were industrywide but more pronounced for
reinsurers and insurers specializing in long-tailed GL sublines.
Section II provides background and summary data on industrywide
GL insurance premiums, losses, and operating margins. Section III
presents the models of inadequate prices. Section IV describes the
empirical methodology and data. Section V reports results. Section VI
concludes.

(1992) presents evidence that multiline loss forecast revisions by property-liability insurers are larger for financially weak insurers that may have greater incentive to understate
initial forecasts.
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II. General Liability Insurance Premiums, Losses, and
Operating Margins

Standard financial theory predicts that break-even premiums equal the
risk-adjusted discounted value of expected cash outflows for claims,
sales expenses, income taxes, and any other costs (e.g., Myers and
Cohn 1986). We use the term "perfect markets model" to refer to

this model, with the additional assumptions (1) that expectations are
conditional on all information available when policies are sold and
(2) that insurer capital is sufficient to produce a low level of insolvency
risk. This terminology encompasses the notion of market efficiency
(prices reflect full-information conditional expectations) and insurance

markets characterized by free entry, by perfectly elastic supply of
capital at a cost commensurate with risk, and by sufficient incentives
for insurers to operate with low insolvency risk.
In a strict sense, the hypothesis that insurance prices can be fully
explained by the perfect markets model is surely false, given costs of
information and adjusting supply. The key questions are whether
prices deviate substantially from levels predicted by this model and,
if so, what the causes of these deviations are. Answering these questions is difficult, however, because full-information conditional expectations, risk-adjusted discount rates, and other factors (such as expected cash flow patterns and tax liabilities) that affect break-even
premium rates are unobservable. In particular, realized claim costs
may differ substantially from full-information conditional expectations
at the time of sale, and reported loss forecasts may be deliberately
biased.

Figures 1 and 2 present aggregate industry data for 1976-89 to illustrate grounds for the debate over whether changes in GL premiums
have been consistent with the perfect markets model and to provide
background for our subsequent analysis. Figure 1 shows annual nationwide earned premiums net of insurer operating expenses (agents' com-

missions and other sales costs, including state premium taxes) in constant GNP-adjusted 1989 dollars.7 It also shows, again in constant
dollars, discounted forecasts of claim costs for accidents occurring
during the year, using year-end ("initial") reported loss forecasts, and
discounted forecasts of claim costs for accidents in the same years,
using updated loss forecasts. The updated forecasts are those reported
at year-end 1989 for accident years 1980-89 and at year-end 1985 (the
latest available data) for accident years 1976-79.8 Since coverage un7. Using gross national product (GNP) to obtain constant dollars adjusts for changes
in the overall price level and possible changes in the demand for coverage as a function
of overall economic activity.

8. Both the initial and updated loss forecasts were discounted by using an assumed
cash flow schedule based on the claims payout pattern for accidents in 1980. As of
year-end 1989, 11.8% of reported losses for accidents in 1980 were unpaid. A payout
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FIG. 1.-General liability insurance industry premiums less expenses, discounted initial loss forecasts, and discounted updated loss forecasts: 1976-89
(measured in billions of constant 1989 gross-national-product-adjusted dollars).
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FIG. 2. -General liability insurance industry pretax operating margins, using
discounted initial and discounted updated loss forecasts: 1976-89.
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der policies sold in one year can extend into the next, claim costs for
year t accidents arise from policies sold in years t and t - 1.9 The
discounted forecasts are only for accidents occurring in the year; that

is, they do not reflect forecast revisions for accidents in other years.
Discounting of loss forecasts controls for the predicted effects of interest rate changes on discounted expected costs and thus break-even
premiums.

The perfect markets model implies that premiums less operating
expenses should approximate forecasts at the time policies are sold of

discounted expected claim costs and other costs (such as expected tax

liabilities) not included in operating expenses. With accurate reporting,
initial loss forecasts for year t would reflect expectations at the time

policies were sold (in years t and t - 1), plus forecast revisions through
year t. Updated loss forecasts would reflect revisions in forecasts between the time policies were sold and year-end 1989 (or year-end 1985
for accident years 1976-79). However, reported losses may deviate
substantially from true loss expectations to the extent that insurers
optimize loss reporting, given income tax rules and solvency monitor-

ing by consumers and regulators (e.g., Weiss 1985), so that reported
losses may deviate systematically from expectations.10
As shown in figure 1, discounted initial loss forecasts and premiums
less operating expenses fell during the early 1980s and increased

sharply in 1985-86. Increasing (decreasing) interest rates during the
former (latter) period account for at least part of this movement. But
premiums less operating expenses declined more rapidly than discounted initial loss forecasts during the early 1980s and increased more
rapidly during 1985-86. Large upward forecast revisions occurred

through 1989 for policies sold in the early 1980s. If, as is suggested by
industry analysts, initial loss forecasts were deliberately understated
during the early 1980s, reported forecast revisions would exceed true
forecast revisions.
pattern of .03, .026, .022, .02, and .02 was assumed for years 11-15. The reported loss
forecasts include paid losses plus loss reserves, which represent insurer forecasts of the
ultimate cost of unpaid claims for accidents in the year (including forecasts of claims
for accidents as yet unreported). They also include paid and estimated unpaid claim
settlement expenses.
9. The average yield on new issues of 5-year government bonds in years t and t - I
was used to discount estimated future cash outflows for year t accidents. Similarly, the
average operating expense ratio for years t and t - 1 was used to calculate approximate
generally accepted accounting principles expenses, and average GNP for years t and
t - 1 was used to calculate constant dollar amounts. "Earned" premiums (premium
revenues from insurer income statements) are shown because they also correspond to
policies sold in years t and t - 1. Changes in "written" premiums (less operating
expenses), which represent cash inflows for policies sold during a given year only, were
generally more pronounced than changes in earned premiums.
10. Note also that absolute differences between initial and updated loss forecasts
could well be smaller toward the end of the period shown simply because the forecasts
are updated for fewer years.
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Figure 2 shows annual operating margins (premiums less operating
expenses less discounted loss forecasts, as a proportion of premiums)

for GL insurance using both initial and updated loss forecasts. The
initial operating margins declined substantially in the early 1980s and
increased substantially in 1985-86 in conjunction with premium increases. The updated margins declined each year during 1979-84. They
are negative for 1983-84, suggesting that premiums turned out to be
insufficient to fund operating expenses and claim costs, let alone cover
other costs.

The aggregate data in figures 1 and 2 are at best suggestive. They
could be consistent with the perfect markets model in conjunction with
large unfavorable realizations in claim costs for accidents in the early

1980s and slow revisions in loss forecasts (Harrington 1988). A substantial shift in the loss distribution with slow learning might produce

several consecutive years where ex post costs are much higher than
ex ante full-information conditional expectations. Changes in riskadjusted discount rates or other costs also might explain some of the

variation in operating margins.11 As noted, these accounting data also
could be influenced by deliberate understatement or overstatement of
loss forecasts to manage reported income. But an alternative view of
these data is that premiums declined during the early 1980s relative to
discounted expected costs, that some insurers deliberately understated
initial loss forecasts to mask deteriorating financial results caused by

underpricing, and that underpricing ultimately contributed to the sharp
premium increases of 1985-86.

III. Models of Inadequate Insurer Prices

Inadequate prices relative to ex ante full-information conditional ex-

pectations of claim costs would contradict the perfect markets model;
apparent price inadequacy ex post due to unfavorable realization of

claim costs would not. We model prices that are potentially inadequate
ex ante by introducing two types of heterogeneity among firms: different incentives for solvency and differences in loss forecasts that arise
from heterogeneous information. An important assumption is that de-

mand of many buyers is insensitive to default risk because of guaranty

fund protection, information costs, or both.12 Different incentives for

11. Evidence suggests that the market price of risk is positively related to interest
rates (e.g., Ferson and Harvey 1991). If claim liabilities are positively correlated with
aggregate returns on risky assets, risk-adjusted discount rates for losses could have
increased more than yields on government bonds during the early 1980s when interest
rates rose and less than bond yields when interest rates fell during 1985-86.
12. If low-price, high-default risk insurers simply attract less risk-averse customers
from high-price, low-default risk firms, the notion of inadequate prices becomes more
ambiguous.
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solvency are suggested by work on insurer capital structure and default
risk (e.g., Munch and Smallwood 1980, 1982). Industry analysts treat
heterogeneity in loss forecasts for comparable risks as an accepted
fact (e.g., Stewart 1984). Intuitive explanations of the basic results

follow. Appendix A contains a formal model.
A. Moral Hazard
Some firms may price too low because of weak incentives for safety

and the moral hazard (MH) that arises when liability is limited, when
demand is invariant to default risk, and when guaranty fund assessments against insurers are risk insensitive. Willingness to incur risk

will differ across firms, reflecting the value of nontransferable tangible
capital (some physical assets) and intangible capital that would be lost
from insolvency (Munch and Smallwood 1982; Finsinger and Pauly
1984; also see Herring and VanKudre 1987). Intangible capital consists

of the value of reputation and any quasi rents on renewal business.

Policyholder-specific intangible capital includes the investment in establishing a book of business, including the cost of attracting and

screening a new policyholder. Depending on policyholder turnover,
the optimal pricing strategy to recoup this investment may be to charge
an initial price below the first-year marginal cost, inclusive of this fixed
cost, and to price above marginal cost on renewal business. Common

intangible capital reflects the firm's investment in reputation for a highquality product (promptness in claims handling, provision of other ser-

vices, or, if policyholders care, low insolvency risk).13
If a firm becomes insolvent, it loses its nontransferable tangible and
intangible capital; that is, it loses its "franchise value." Shareholder
wealth maximization implies that the firm's levels of financial capital
and supply price are positively related to franchise value (see
App. A). Firms with little franchise value have incentives to hold relatively little financial capital, price low, and have high insolvency risk.
Alternatively, unfavorable realizations of claim costs or asset returns
could lead to go-for-broke behavior in the form of low prices.
If some firms price too low, firms with significant intangible capital
will optimally reduce price within some range to mitigate loss of customers and associated quasi rents that are earned if customers renew.
Thus, inadequate prices for some firms could cause inadequate prices
for other firms. The long-run equilibrium price for a firm is positively
related to investments in nontransferable tangible and intangible capital and therefore must normally exceed the marginal per-policyholder
13. Klein and Leffler (1981) show that in markets for experience goods, firms that
invest in reputation for high quality will tend to charge prices above marginal cost in
order to recoup the cost of this investment. Similarly, the cost of fixed investments in
physical capital, such as claims-processing facilities, may be amortized over several
years and recovered by pricing above marginal claims cost.
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expected loss and expense cost, in order to earn a normal return. In
the short run it is optimal to cut price to retain business as long as
price exceeds marginal cost, even if price is below the long-run equilibrium level.

The possibility that MH will cause some firms to charge low prices,
gain market share, and have high default risk clearly is not unique to
insurance. It is another case in which low quality drives out high quality when demand is insensitive to quality, due to either costly information or flat-rated insurance against the consequences of low quality.
Characteristics that make liability insurance particularly vulnerable to

MH-induced low prices include substantial, albeit limited, government-mandated guarantees of insurer obligations that were adopted in
the early to mid-1970s and up-front payment of premiums coupled with

average claim payout lags of 5 years or more on product liability and

other long-tailed lines. In addition, losses fall on third-party claimants
if the insurer defaults and the policyholder is judgment proof, and there
exist formidable problems in regulatory detection and verification of
inadequate prices or other forms of increased risk taking.
The MH hypothesis predicts that firms with weak safety incentives
will charge low prices and grow more rapidly than firms with higher

target safety levels. As noted earlier, loss forecast revisions will be
positively related to MH-induced low prices, assuming that firms deliberately understate initial reported loss forecasts to hide inadequate
prices from regulators but that positive forecast revisions become inev-

itable as paid claims accumulate (see n. 6 above). Premium growth

should be positively related to forecast revisions, reflecting demand response to low prices. As we explain in Section IV below, possible indicators of propensity for low pricing due to MH are use of reinsurance, organizational form (stock vs. mutual), leverage, and investment mix.
B. Heterogeneous Information

With heterogeneous information (HI), some firms with optimistic private information on future claim costs may price too low relative to

full-information conditional expectations and thus exert downward
pressure on other firms' prices. In particular, HI could give rise to
winner's curse effects, whereby some firms with optimistic information
price too low, grow rapidly, and subsequently experience losses. Inadequate prices due to HI would be especially likely for inexperienced
firms.

The sale of liability insurance to a unique risk is a form of common
value auction. Public information for forecasting a risk's expected
claim cost includes that provided by trade associations. Heterogeneous
private information includes an insurer's own past experience on comparable risks. Basing prices (bids) only on the conditional forecast,
given the insurer's private information and public information, will
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expose the insurer to a winner's curse even if these conditional forecasts are unbiased. The reason is that the conditional expectation of
loss given that the insurer sells the policy (i.e., has the lowest bid)
exceeds the conditional forecast based on the insurer's private infor-

mation and public information.

The winner's curse can be avoided if bidders adjust their bids given
knowledge of the bidding processes used by other firms and the joint

density of public/private information and expected loss costs. If all
firms bid optimally, under certain assumptions the winning bid con-

verges to the true value of the object being bid for as the number of
bidders increases (Wilson 1977; Milgrom 1979). These assumptions

are strong, and convergence need not occur in practice. Plausibly,
established firms have learned to adjust their forecasts to avoid the
curse. However, if inexperienced firms, such as new entrants, make
inadequate adjustments, they will price too low and exert downward

pressure on other firms' prices.
In markets for classes of homogeneous risks, which we model for-

mally in Appendix A, rational behavior requires firms to infer other
firms' information from market prices. This requires knowledge of the
joint distribution of market prices and private information (e.g., Grossman 1981). Under certain conditions, prices obtained in a rational expectations equilibrium fully reveal diverse private information (e.g.,
Jordan and Radner 1982). The necessary assumptions are again strong
and unlikely to hold in insurance markets characterized by large shifts
in loss distributions over time. If inexperienced firms place too much
emphasis on their own information or draw incorrect inferences from
other firms' actions, such firms with low forecasts and thus low prices
will tend to grow rapidly, experience large unfavorable forecast errors,
and create downward pressure on prices of firms with higher forecasts.
Inadequate pricing due to HI is more likely when firm-level demand
is elastic with respect to price but inelastic with respect to default
risk, and when the market is characterized by easy entry and by slow
resolution of uncertainty and thus slow learning about the accuracy of

prior forecasts. Heterogeneity in forecasts will also be more pronounced when sources of information are diverse, when heterogeneous
production or cost functions make it difficult to infer other firms' infor-

mation, when the full-information conditional variance of claim costs
is large, and when the effects of heterogeneity cannot be reduced by
informed traders. Markets for long-tailed liability insurance exhibit
most of these characteristics. In particular, both the mean and conditional variance of claim costs appear to have increased in the 1980s,
making it more difficult to forecast losses.
The HI hypothesis predicts that firms with lower loss forecasts will
charge lower prices and grow more rapidly than firms with higher
forecasts and prices. Low forecast/price firms also will be more likely
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to sell any coverage and thus more likely to appear in our database

than high forecast firms. Low forecast/price firms should experience
relatively greater upward forecast revisions over time as information
accumulates. Again, premium growth should be positively related to

forecast revisions. Since low prices due to HI are more likely for
inexperienced firms, possible indicators of propensity for low pricing
include recent entry into the GL market and specialization in GL, as

we explain further in Section IV."
IV. Empirical Methodology and Data
A. Loss Forecast Revisions and Premium Growth

The loss forecast revision in year t, %FR, equals the percentage difference between updated (through year t + 5) and initial (end-of-year t)

loss forecasts for accidents in year t, net of reinsurance.15 The %FR
reflects revisions in reported estimates of the ultimate value of claims,
including paid claims and the estimated value of unpaid claims (including claims incurred but not reported) between years t and t + 5. Pre-

mium growth, %GR, is the percentage growth in premiums written in
year t, net of reinsurance.
As discussed above, firms that price low due to MH or HI should

have larger values of %FR and %GR, other things being equal. In
addition, if %FR is inversely related to price, %GR should be positively related to %FR. Apart from any MH or HI effects, %FR should
reflect idiosyncratic and industrywide forecast error relative to fullinformation conditional expectations. The resulting differences across
firms in %FR could reflect differences in business mix. Subsequent
experience suggests that firms that specialized in risky long-tailed GL

sublines would have large positive forecast revisions for policies sold
during the early 1980s.16 Differences in premium growth across firms
also will reflect any shifts in demand for product offerings and possibly
any differential growth in expected claim and other costs per unit of
coverage.

We estimate reduced-form equations for %FR and %GR to test for
MH and HI effects. We include variables that measure MH and HI

14. The relationship between overall firm size and forecast revisions is ambiguous,
as we explain in Sec. IV.
15. At the time of our data, insurers did not report comparable loss forecasts before
reinsurance.
16. Differences in %FR across firms also will reflect any differences in incentives to
manage (smooth) reported loss reserves (see Weiss 1985). Smoothing should be unrelated to price, unless it reflects MH or HI, in which case our interpretation remains
valid. Differences in %FR that are unrelated to price should be unrelated to growth.
Thus, it is unlikely that management of loss reserves would lead to a false diagnosis of
low pricing and more rapid growth due to MH or HI in our empirical tests.
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propensities and variables that could affect %FR and %GR apart from
MH or HI. A variable that is negatively (positively) related to price
due to either MH or HI should be significantly and positively (negatively) related to both %FR and %GR. Significance in only one equa-

tion would imply that a variable is unrelated to price and thus be
inconsistent with MH or HI. We also estimate a structural model to

test for a positive relation between %GR and %FR. As noted, our
analysis assumes that matching price cuts by other firms do not eliminate cross-sectional price variation. By reducing price variation, price
cuts by other firms in response to low prices due to MH or HI will
reduce the power of our cross-sectional tests.
B. Moral Hazard Variables
Reinsurance. To test for low pricing due to MH, we include the

ratio of reinsurance recoverable (on paid and unpaid losses and un-

earned premiums) to assets as a measure of the transfer of liabilities
to reinsurers. Solvency regulation monitors insurers' policy-related liabilities net of reinsurance if the reinsurer meets minimum require-

ments. Thus, reinsurance enables insurers to reduce leverage (net of
reinsurance) and to write more direct business, given their capital,

without violating regulatory norms. The efficient hedging rationale for

reinsurance purchases (Hoerger, Sloan, and Hassan 1990; Mayers and

Smith 1990; Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson 1992) suggests that reinsurance demand will reflect the same determinants as the demand for
insurance and other forms of corporate hedging. Nonetheless, reinsur-

ance could also be used to conceal MH-induced low pricing, as is
suggested by anecdotal evidence (see U.S. House of Representatives
1990).

General liability insurers wishing to price low and grow rapidly because of MH during the early 1980s would be likely to reduce the
effects on premium growth net of reinsurance (and leverage) by
reinsuring large amounts of business.17 Much of this reinsurance would
be expected to be purchased from low-quality reinsurers also subject

to MH or to reduce growth and leverage without shifting significant
risk to reinsurers. 8 However, given that the use of reinsurance to
17. This behavior could have become more prevalent after the adoption of government-mandated guarantees of direct insurance obligations in the 1970s, and in response
to unexpected increases in claim liabilities and any resultant go-for-broke behavior. The
intensity of reinsurance regulation has increased since the late 1980s, partly in response
to the perception that reinsurance was being used to conceal risk taking
18. Some reinsurance arrangements allow insurers to increase reported capital by
transferring undiscounted loss liabilities to reinsurers at prices that reflect discounting
of these liabilities. Adiel (1993) discusses how these arrangements allow management
of reported capital. Asymmetric information might also have enabled high-risk primary
insurers to reinsure at prices unfavorable to reinsurers, but this scenario would require
that reinsurers were unable to anticipate adverse selection.
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conceal risk taking involves some cost (e.g., transaction costs and/or
sharing of potential profits), insurers with low prices due to MH would
be expected to have higher premium growth net of reinsurance than
would higher priced firms.
Thus, under the MH hypothesis, extensive use of reinsurance should

be related to low prices and thus positively related to both %FR and

%GR. A positive relation between reinsurance and %FR is not an
unambiguous indicator of MH. Insurers that specialized in high-risk

GL sublines may have reinsured heavily for purposes of efficient hedging and may also have incurred relatively large unfavorable realizations

in claim costs. But the business mix/hedging rationale does not predict
systematically low prices and thus greater premium growth net of reinsurance for insurers with large amounts of reinsured liabilities. Positive
correlation between direct (before reinsurance) premium growth and
the use of reinsurance would be expected without MH because reinsur-

ance can allow more direct business to be written safely without ex-

panding capital proportionately. However, this function of reinsurance
does not imply more rapid growth in premiums net of reinsurance.
Mutual organization. We include a binary variable equal to one

for mutual organizations and zero for stock firms. Sublines of GL that
are vulnerable to large forecast errors (e.g., product liability) generally
entail substantial managerial discretion in pricing. Theories of organizational form (Mayers and Smith 1988; Lamm-Tennant and Starks
1993) and the limited ability of mutuals to raise capital predict that
mutual insurers are less likely to write these risky lines. Thus, unob-

served differences in business mix could produce a negative relation
between mutual organization and %FR during a period characterized
by large unfavorable realizations in claim costs. Under this perfect

markets/business mix hypothesis, larger values of %FR for stock insurers would reflect larger unintended forecast error, not intentional
low pricing. Therefore, more rapid growth for stocks than mutuals is
not predicted.

Mutuals will be less likely than stocks to price low because of MH
if managers (and possibly owner/customers) are averse to financial
distress; that is, MH will be less severe for mutuals (Hansmann 1985;
Garven 1987). Thus, like the perfect markets/business mix hypothesis,
the MH hypothesis predicts that mutuals will experience lower %FR.

However, since in this case lower %FR indicates higher prices, lower
%GR for mutuals also is predicted. Lower growth is not expected if
mutual organization is simply a proxy for specialization in low-risk
lines.l9
19. It conceivably might be argued that the inability of mutuals to issue equity could
lead to slower growth for mutuals during a period of rapidly increasing market demand.
This argument would not predict slower GL premium growth for mutuals in the early
1980s when industry-wide premiums were declining relative to GNP.
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Leverage and investment mix. Other risky strategies, such as operating with high financial leverage and/or holding a risky asset portfo-

lio, could be correlated with intentional low pricing due to MH. The
MH hypothesis suggests a possible nonmonotonic relationship between leverage and risk taking, and hence a nonmonotonic relationship

between leverage, %FR, and %GR. Up to some level, increased lever-

age could discourage risk taking if firms try to protect their tangible
and intangible capital. But if beyond a certain point, high leverage
indicates little intangible capital or produces go-for-broke behavior,

the effect of additional leverage on %FR and %GR should be positive.
The ratio of gross liabilities (net liabilities plus reinsurance recoverable) to assets and the square of this ratio are included to measure

gross financial leverage. Given the inclusion of reinsurance recoverable to assets, the coefficients for leverage estimate the effect of increases in unreinsured liabilities. This leverage measure has several

limitations: it will understate true leverage if an insurer understates its
claim liabilities, it is based on book rather than market values of liabilities and some assets, and it does not reflect the capitalized value of

quasi rents. The ratio of the market value of common stock invest-

ments to the book value of invested assets is included as a rough proxy

for investment risk. Since the volatility of insurer accounting and, most
likely, market returns increases with this variable, high values could
indicate a propensity for high-risk behavior because of MH.20
C. Heterogeneous Information Variables

Entry. The HI hypothesis suggests that new entrants are more
likely to price low on average due to optimistic forecasts and thus

likely to have larger %FR and %GR.21 Lower prices (larger %FR)
and more rapid growth are predicted for recent entrants with no prior
property-liability insurance experience than for established insurers
entering GL that have prior experience in other lines. More rapid
growth by new entrants also might be consistent with the perfect mar-

kets model. For example, an established firm with business in other
lines might grow relatively rapidly on entering GL by marketing GL
to its existing customers. However, the perfect markets model does

not predict lower prices and thus higher %FR for entrants.
Two binary indicators of new entrants are included to test for low
pricing due to HI. The GL entrant variable indicates a recent entrant
20. Increases in interest rates during the sample period likely reduced the market
value of equity for many insurers given the long duration of their bond portfolios. While

this may have been associated with MH, including go-for-broke behavior, we were
skeptical of developing a useful measure of interest rate risk using available data.
21. While we regard recent entry as primarily indicating possible effects of HI, new
entrants also may have relatively less nontransferable tangible and intangible capital
and thus may be more prone to MH.
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to GL with experience in other lines. It equals one if the insurer did
not write GL but did have positive net premiums written for other

lines in 1976. The property-liability entrant variable equals one if the
insurer had zero GL and zero other property-liability net premiums in
1976 or was not included in the data as of 1976.22
General liablility specialization. Holding total premiums constant,
insurers that write a relatively large proportion of business in GL have

greater line-specific experience in GL. Increased specialization in GL
also would make GL pricing errors more costly, providing additional
incentive to develop pricing expertise. Thus, the HI hypothesis implies
that increased specialization in GL will be positively related to price

and hence negatively related to %FR and %GR.
We include the ratio of GL net premiums written to total net premiums written in year t - 1 to measure specialization in GL. A negative
coefficient for this variable in the %GR equation also might be consistent with life-cycle effects; that is, holding size (total net premiums)
constant, firms with greater GL premium volume in year t - 1 could
have slower GL premium growth in year t. We therefore include the
ratio of total GL net premiums written from 1976 through year t - 2
("prior" GL premiums) to total net premiums written in year t - 1
as an additional measure of experience in the GL equation. This variable might be less affected by life-cycle effects.
D. Other Variables

We include the log of assets in the %FR equation and the log of total
net premiums written in the %GR equation to control for any sizerelated effects, recognizing that these variables are unlikely to provide

unambiguous evidence of MH or HI. If small firms in the sample are

more likely to have low forecasts because of inexperience, or have
weaker incentives for safety due to lower intangible capital per unit of

output, size should be negatively related to %FR and %GR due to HI
and MH, respectively. However, if large firms typically write higher
limits and riskier coverages than small firms, and these coverages ex-

perienced larger industrywide or idiosyncratic forecast errors during
the early 1980s, these unobserved differences in business mix could
lead to a positive relation between %FR and size. Thus, while a significant negative estimate for size in the %FR equation might provide
strong evidence of low prices due to MH and/or HI, an insignificant
or positive estimate would not be contradictory. In addition, simple

22. The A.M. Best tapes at the University of Pennsylvania contain data from 1976
onward. The number of entrants in the regression sample was small each year, ranging
from 16 in 1980 to 25 in 1982. Entrants' share of GL net written premiums (before
excluding extreme values, see below) ranged from 1.9 percent in 1980 to 3.6 percent in
1982.
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life-cycle models of firm growth suggest that small firms will grow
more rapidly than large firms for any given price.
Three variables are included as rough controls for insurer business
mix. Binary variables indicate reinsurers and direct writers, as classified by the A.M. Best Company. Reinsurers commonly write highlimits, excess-of-loss coverage for GL. Since unfavorable realizations
in claim costs have a much bigger effect on excess-of-loss than on

primary coverage, %FR will likely be greater for reinsurers during the
early 1980s. There are no strong predictions for direct writers versus

independent agency insurers. Direct writers generally specialize in providing coverage to small to medium-sized businesses. The vulnerability
of this coverage to large unfavorable realizations in claim costs might
differ from coverage sold by independent agency insurers. Direct writ-

ers are likely to have greater intangible capital or firm-specific investments at risk. However, many independent agents also have intangible
capital at stake that could cause them to avoid dealing with risky insur-

ers. Relative growth rates for direct writers and agency insurers could
vary for reasons unrelated to MH and/or HI (e.g., technological and

demand changes that favor a particular distribution method). Finally,
as a rough control for specialization in long-tailed lines of GL, we
include the ratio of cumulative paid claims, as of year t + 5, for
accidents in year t to the updated forecast, as of year t + 5, of losses
for accidents in year t.23 If longer-tailed risks experienced greater unanticipated shifts in the loss distribution, this variable will be negatively
related to %FR.
E. Estimation Procedure and Data

We estimated the %FR and %GR equations using annual data for 1980,
1981, and 1982 for over 200 insurance company groups and unaffiliated

companies that survived until 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. The
variable %FR is only available for firms that survive through year
t + 5. Results of additional tests (see App. B), including estimation of
the %GR reduced form equation including firms that did not survive,
suggest that survivor bias is unlikely to have a substantive impact on
the reported results. We used weighted least squares to estimate the
reduced-form equations and weighted two-stage least squares for the
structural equation for %GR. Two-stage least squares was used in the
latter case because %FR and %GR should be jointly determined if

%FR reflects price differences and because %FR is a noisy measure

23. For 1981 and 1982, we use the values of this ratio for accident years 1980 and

1981, respectively, to reduce possible spurious correlation between this variable and
%FR. Since we did not have data on updated accident-year loss forecasts for 1979, for
1980 we use the value of the ratio for 1980. Similar results were obtained when this
variable was omitted.
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TABLE 1 Mean and Tenth-, Twenty-fifth-, Fiftieth-, Seventy-fifth-, and
Ninetieth-Percentile Values of Cross-sectional Distributions of Loss
Forecast Revisions (%FR) and Growth in Net Premiums Written

(%GR)

Variable

and

1980 1981 1982
Statistic (%) (%) (%)

Loss forecast revision

(% FR):

Mean
18.6
29.3
39.0
90
74.2
110.6
119.6
75
36.1
38.3
61.9
50
7.4
11.3
19.9
25
11.7
11.6
-8.1
10
-30.1
-27.0
-26.1

Growth in net premiums
written (%GR):
Mean
1.5
2.0
1.7
90
31.6
28.4
31.1
75
9.8
9.7
9.9
50
.4
-3.8
-3.2
25
10.5
16.0
14.5
10
-21.8
-27.1
-38.6
N

238

242

245

NOTE.-%FR is the percentage change in the reported loss forecast for accidents in year t between
years t and t + 5; %GR is the percentage change in net premiums written between years t and
t - 1.

of price. The weights used to control for heteroscedasticity are related
to size in the %GR equation and to GL premium volume and the
reinsurer and mutual dummies in the %FR equation. Unweighted data
produced similar results. Unless otherwise noted, all regressors are
lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. Estimation methods
and data sources are described further in Appendix B.

V. Empirical Results

Table 1 shows means and selected percentile values of the crosssectional distributions of annual values of %FR and %GR during
1980-82. The data on %FR indicate substantial and increasing forecast

revisions over the period. For 1982, the mean and median %FR were

39% and 20%, respectively, compared to 19% and 7% in 1980. While
low initial loss forecasts and positive forecast revisions are consistent
with MH or HI, the large magnitude of the mean and median values

of these revisions suggests large and industry-wide unfavorable realizations in claim costs.

Table 2 reports the reduced-form %FR and %GR equations. Overall,
the results provide evidence of low pricing due to MH but not due to
HI. The estimated coefficient for the ratio of reinsurance recoverable
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TABLE 2 Cross-sectional Tests for Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Information

Effects on Loss Forecast Revisions (%FR) and Growth in Net
Premiums Written (%GR)-Weighted Least-Squares Estimation of

%FR and %GR Reduced-Form Equations
1980

1981

1982

Variables %FR %GR %FR %GR %FR %GR
A. Moral hazard:

Intercept 1.120 .648 1.804 .575 2.452 .772
(1.68) (1.63) (1.87) (1.40) (2.88) (2.17)
Reinsurance

recoverable/assets 1.639 .572 .588 1.029 2.654 .587

(3.05) (1.94) (.86) (3.37) (4.06) (2.01)

Mutual - .142 - .075 -.372 - .130 - .264 - .030
(-2.06) (-1.81) (-3.90) (-2.92) (-2.93) (-.71)
Liabilities/assets -.601 -.121 -1.856 -.470 -1.621 -1.241
(-.62) (-.14) (-1.71) (.96) (-1.50) (-2.66)

(Liabilities/

assets) squared - .250 - .049 1.047 .029 - .008 .391
(-.40) (-.14) (1.53) (.09) (-.01) (1.24)
Common stocks/
invested assets -.086 -.194 .288 .035 .076 -.001
(-.26) (-1.07) (.73) (.20) (.21) (-.01)
B. Heterogeneous
information:
GL entrant -.146 -.086 -.284 .325 -.053 .383
(-.70) (-.82) (-.92) (2.45) (-.21) (3.50)
PL entrant -.174 .091 -.372 .104 -.000 .295
(- 1.10) (.97) (-3.90) (1.12) (-.00) (3.73)

GL premiums/
total premiums - .148 - .132 - .444 - .381 - .160 - .609
(-.84) (- .81) (-1.81) (-2.33) (- .70) (-3.84)

Prior GL premiums/
total premiums ... - .126 ... - .027 ... .110
(-1.52) (-.60) (3.70)
C. Control:
Log of assets -.017 ... -.035 ... .006 ...
(-.72) (-1.03) (.20)
Log of total net
premiums written ... -.021 ... -.021 ... -.005
(-1.61) (-1.37) (-.36)
Reinsurer .426 - .002 .558 - .093 .603 .042
(2.76) (-.04) (2.70) (-1.28) (3.53) (.66)
Direct writer - .039 .075 .054 .108 -.048 .047
(-.53) (1.72) (.53) (2.21) (-.49) (1.02)

Cumulative paid/
updated loss forecast - .185 -.100 -.092 .126 -1.412 -.040

(- .70) (- .72) (- .25) (.79) (-4.45) (- .30)
N

237

234

240

240

244

244

NOTE.-%FR and %GR were divided by 100 prior to estimation. Regressors are based on data
available at the beginning of the year (t - 1), except for cumulative paid/updated loss forecast for
1980, which reflects data at year-end 1980. "Prior GL premiums" denotes general liability premiums
from 1976 through year t - 2. PL = property-liability. The weights used are described in Appendix
B. Values in parentheses are t-statistics.
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to assets is uniformly positive in both the %FR and %GR equations
and generally significant. This result supports the MH hypothesis that
reinsurance was used to conceal low prices and excessive growth. It

seems unlikely that the positive effects in both equations are due instead to possible correlation between the use of reinsurance and specialization in coverage that experienced large shifts in the loss distribution. This alternative explanation does not explain the relationship
between reinsurance and premium growth (net of reinsurance). The

findings for mutuals also provide some support for the MH hypothesis.
Mutuals had lower estimated %FR and %GR in all 3 years. The estimates for %FR are significant in all 3 years, and the estimated growth
differential is significant at the .05 level for a one-tailed test for 2 of
the 3 years. While lower %FR for mutuals could be influenced by
specialization in less risky GL lines, risk specialization cannot readily

explain lower %GR for mutuals.
Leverage (liabilities/assets), leverage squared, and the common
stock ratio are generally insignificant in both equations. These results
suggest that any low pricing due to MH was not related to these variables. As noted earlier, however, if firms attempted to conceal intentional risk taking by underreporting liabilities, reported leverage contains measurement error that will tend to bias against finding the
correlation expected under the MH hypothesis. The common stock
ratio also is an imperfect indicator of investment risk.
The results generally do not support the hypothesis of low pricing
due to HI. While there is some evidence that new entrants grew more
rapidly (three of the six coefficients for entrants are positive and sig-

nificant in the %GR equations), entrants did not experience larger forecast revisions, as expected if higher growth was induced by lower
prices. This suggests that the more rapid growth of entrants was attrib-

utable to life-cycle effects rather than low prices. The ratio of GL
premiums to total premiums is negatively and significantly related to

%GR in 1981 and 1982, which is consistent with the hypothesis that
firms with less GL experience grew more rapidly. However, since
the estimated relationship is negative but not significant in the %FR

equation, the relationship in the %GR equation may more likely be
due to life-cycle effects than to systematic underpricing. The erratic

results for cumulative prior GL experience are also inconsistent with
the HI hypothesis.
The results for reinsurers are consistent with large unfavorable realizations in claim costs. When other characteristics are controlled for,

reinsurers experienced larger upward revisions in loss forecasts, with
the estimated differential increasing from 43% in 1980 to 60% in 1982.
The fact that reinsurers did not grow more rapidly suggests that larger
forecast revisions were not caused by low prices due to MH or HI.
The large negative coefficient for the ratio of cumulative paid losses
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TABLE 3 Cross-sectional Tests for a Relationship between Growth in Net
Premiums Written (%GR) and Loss Forecast Revisions (%FR)Weighted Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimation of %GR Structural
Equation
1980

Intercept

.408

-

1981

.025

(1.15)

(-

1982

.060

.04)

(.16)

Loss forecast revision (%FR) .303 .526 .190
(2.24) (3.31) (2.30)
Log of total net premiums written -.018 -.013 -.019
(-1.28)

(-.55)

(-1.35)

GL premiums/total premiums -.221 -.218 -.200
GL

entrant

PL

entrant

Mutual

-

Reinsurer
Direct

(-1.93) (-1.14) (-1.64)
-.020 .527 .349
(-.18) (2.48) (2.89)
.165

.051
.209
(1.76) (.38) (2.53)
.019
.071
.020

(- 1.41) (.75) (.40)

-

.130 - .366 - .057
(-1.37) (-2.61) (- .63)
writer .078 .071 .063
(1.71) (.94) (1.25)

Cumulative paid/updated loss
forecast
N

234

-

.093 .145
(-.62) (.56)
240

.255
(1.36)

244

NOTE.-%FR is treated as endogenous; %GR should be positively related to %FR if %FR is
inversely related to price. Regressors are based on data available at the beginning of the year
(t - 1), except for cumulative paid/updated loss forecast for 1980, which reflects data at year-end
1980. Data are weighted by the square root of log GL (general liability) net premiums written in year
t - 1. PL = property-liability. Values in parentheses are t-statistics.

to updated loss forecasts (an inverse proxy for firms specializing in
long-tailed business) in the %FR equation but not the %GR equation
for 1982 also suggests large industywide forecast errors on long-tailed
business. The coefficients on the size and direct writer variables generally are insignificant, as expected if these variables reflect several factors with offsetting effects.

Table 3 reports weighted two-stage least-squares estimates of the
structural equation for %GR, treating %FR as endogenous. Leverage,
reinsurance recoverable to assets, and common stocks to assets are
identifying predetermined variables. This equation allows a test of
whether %FR reflected price differences that in turn affected growth
rates. %GR is significantly and positively related to %FR in all three
years, consistent with %FR being inversely related to price.24 This
24. The results for this variable were somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of several
(two to four) potential outliers each year. When these observations were excluded, the
coefficients and t-values for %FR in the premium growth equation were .163 (1.33) for
1980, .867 (1.73) for 1981, and .319 (2.71) for 1982.
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result cannot be readily explained by unfavorable realizations in claim
costs that are unrelated to price. It is consistent with the hypothesis

that some firms charged lower prices due to either MH or HI, experienced large upward forecast revisions, and grew more rapidly.

VI. Conclusions

Our theoretical analysis suggests that moral hazard can lead insurers
with few assets at risk to price too low. We also have analyzed how
low prices might arise from heterogeneous information across firms.
In either case, firms that price too low will gain market share (assuming

other firms do not fully match the price cuts), unless policyholders
understand and internalize the risks, which is unlikely because of guar-

anty fund protection and information costs. Inadequate prices by some
firms may cause other firms to cut price to retain business that yields

quasi rents in future periods. Thus, inadequate pricing by some firms
can induce inadequate pricing by other firms in the short run.
Our empirical analysis uses loss forecast revisions (which should be
inversely related to prices) and premium growth net of reinsurance for

GL during 1980-82 to test for evidence of moral hazard and heterogeneous information effects. Our results provide evidence of low pricing
due to moral hazard but not due to heterogeneous information. The
reduced-form results suggest that some insurers used reinsurance to
conceal low prices and excessive growth. Forecast revisions and pre-

mium growth were significantly and positively related to the amount
of liabilities ceded to reinsurers, controlling for the influence of other
firm characteristics. The former result also could reflect efficient hedging, by reinsuring sublines of GL that were more vulnerable to unfavor-

able realizations in claim costs. However, efficient hedging and the
expected effects of reinsurance on direct premium growth (before reinsurance) cannot readily explain the positive relationship between the
use of reinsurance and premium growth net of reinsurance. The results

also suggest that mutual firms, which should be less subject to moral
hazard, maintained higher prices and grew less rapidly. Forecast revi-

sions and premium growth were significantly smaller for mutuals. The

former result could indicate specialization by mutuals in less risky
sublines of GL (see Lamm-Tennant and Starks 1993), but risk specialization cannot readily explain slower premium growth for mutuals.
Our structural equation results provide evidence of a significantly
positive relationship between premium growth and loss forecast revisions. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that forecast
revisions are inversely related to prices due to either moral hazard or
heterogeneous information. However, the reduced-form results provide little evidence that inexperience contributed significantly to inade-
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quate pricing and rapid growth. New entrants and firms with relatively
low premium volume in GL generally did not experience both larger
forecast revisions and more rapid growth, as expected under the heterogeneous information hypothesis. Other findings are consistent with
substantial unanticipated shifts in the underlying loss distribution that
produced large industry-wide forecast errors, particularly for reinsurers and for insurers specializing in long-tailed GL sublines.
Our findings regarding moral hazard-and the possibility that inadequate prices due to moral hazard contributed to subsequent insolvencies and to the hard market of 1985-86-support increased concern
by policy makers with regard to intentional risk taking and the use
of reinsurance and underreporting of loss reserves to mask high-risk
behavior. Future research may be able to develop better measures of
propensity for low pricing and other forms of intentional risk taking,
of inexperience, and of competitors' responses and thus help better
distinguish these influences during soft markets. As noted earlier, any
tendency toward inadequate pricing in insurance markets cannot continue indefinitely; soft markets must eventually be followed by harder
markets. Another important area for future research is the transition
from soft to hard markets and whether the alternation of soft and hard
markets is in fact a self-generating cycle.

Appendix A
An Illustrative Model
We consider a monopolistically competitive insurance market with limited

liability and claim risk that cannot be eliminated by writing a portfolio of

policies. The monopolistic competition model allows for price variation and
for some degree of brand loyalty. Consumers do not necessarily buy from the
lowest-priced insurer, but they can be attracted to another insurer by a low
enough price. Limited liability, undiversifiable claim risk, and heterogeneity
in either intangible capital or loss forecasts produce endogenous default risk
and differences in pricing incentives across firms. Our basic approach extends
the model of Finsinger and Pauly (1984) by allowing for firm heterogeneity
and for firm price and thus output to be endogenous.
Firm demand q(p, s) depends on own price p and the price of a representa-

tive other firm s, with qp < 0, q, > 0, and qp, > 0. At time 0 the firm chooses

p, invests financial capital of k per policy, and incurs nonloss operating costs

of C(q), with C' > 0, and C" > 0. It pays claims at time 1. Demand is insensitive

to default risk (qk = 0). The firm has intangible capital A, which is invested
at time 0 and is marketable prior to investment. On the basis of Finsinger

and Pauly (1984), firms cannot add financial capital after claims are realized.
Comparable results can be obtained as long as adding financial capital at time
1 is more costly than at time 0 if funds are insufficient to pay claims at time
1. If premiums and financial capital equal or exceed claim costs at time 1,

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 15:41:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

534

Journal

of

Business

residual claimants receive A and any excess funds. If not, the firm defaults
and forfeits A. The key results only require that A decline if premiums and
financial capital are less than claim costs.
Firms maximize the net present value of residual claims. Residual claimants

are risk neutral, and the interest rate is zero. Investing financial capital incurs
a cost (e.g., due to tax effects, as in Myers and Cohn 1986) at time 0 of Tper
dollar invested. At time 1 the mean loss per policy sold is x with cumulative
distribution function F(x), reflecting risk that remains after the insurer writes
a large portfolio of policies. This undiversifiable risk at the firm level could be
caused by parameter uncertainty or correlation in losses across policies. Firms
sell enough policies to eliminate idiosyncratic risk via the law of large numbers
so that F(x) does not depend on q.

Consider first the case in which all firms know F(x) at time 0. A given firm

correctly perceives that it will default if x > p + k with probability 1 - F(p
+ k). If x 2 p + k, the firm is worthless to residual claimants; if x < p + k,
its value is A + (p + k - x)q(p, s). The firm chooses p and k to maximize
expected net present value (dropping arguments of the demand function):
p+k

V = f [A + (p + k - x)q]f(x)dx - C(q) - (1 + T)kq - A.
This can be written
V = qm - C(q) - [1 - F(p + k)]A, (Al)
where
p+ k

m = f (p + k - x)f(x)dx - (1 + T)k (A2)
is the expected margin between p and per-policy claim and capital costs. From
(1), policies will have zero expected net present value if

C(q) + [1 - F(p + k)]A (A)
q

q

that is, the expected margin m between p and per-policy claim and capital

costs must equal average operating costs plus the expected loss of A (per
policy) from default.
The first-order conditions are

Vp = qpm + qmp - C'(q)qp + f(p + k)A = 0, (A4a)
and

Vk= qmk +f(p + k)A = 0, (A4b)
where mp = F(p + k), the probability of survival, and mk = F(p + k) (1 + T) < 0. The second-order conditions are Vpp < 0, Vkk < O, and VppVkk Vkp Vpk> 0.
The first two terms in (A4a) give the expected reduction in qm from an

increase in p. The last two terms give the expected reduction in operating

costs and the expected cost of forfeiting intangible capital. Since qmp and f(p

+ k) are positive and qp < 0, (A4a) requires m > C'(q). When A = 0, Vk is

negative (Mk < 0) for any value of k, and the firm will not commit financial
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capital. If A > 0, the firm has an incentive to commit financial capital to reduce
the likelihood that it forfeits its intangible capital.

Comparative statics for this model (available from us) give PA > 0 and kA
> 0. Hence, larger intangible capital leads to greater financial capital, higher

prices, and lower default risk. An important implication is that if A differs

across firms, high A firms are vulnerable to low prices charged by low A firms.

Unless some consumers have a strong preference for high A firms, low A firms
would be expected to dominate the market over time. Similarly, if exogenous
influences led to a sharp reduction in A, a firm's optimal price (and financial
capital) would drop significantly, so that it might go for broke.
To introduce differences in loss forecasts across firms, consider a firm whose
estimate differs from the mean loss by 0 in each state of the world; that is, it

assumes that the mean loss is given by y = x + 0 with g(y) = f(x) and E(y)
= E(x) + 0. The firm believes that it will forfeit A if y > p + k, which implies

x > p + k - 0. The firm's (perceived) expected net present value to residual
claimants is then given by (Al) with y replacing x. After performing the change

of variable y = x + 0, the expressions for V, m, VP, and Vk are identical to
(A1)-(A4) except that x + 0 replaces x and p + k - 0 replaces p + k.

Comparative statics indicate that po > 0; the sign of ko is ambiguous. Thus,
firms with loss forecasts lower than E(x) (0 < 0) charge lower prices. Such

firms also perceive that they break even (V = 0) at a lower price. If the
distribution of 0 across firms has mean zero and is symmetrically distributed,

the model suggests that the average price will be less than if all firms know
the true distribution of mean loss since firms with negative 0 will sell more

coverage than firms with zero or positive values. The more elastic is firm
demand, the greater would be the downward pressure on average price. An-

other implication is that firms with 0 < 0 would be more likely to sell any
coverage than firms with 0 > 0, at least in the short run.
The optimal adjustment of p to a change in the price of another firm depends

on the sign of Vpk, which is ambiguous if A > 0. However, if k is held constant,
then pS > 0, decreases in prices charged by other firms reduce a firm's optimal
price. Once the firm has invested A and incurred operating costs of C(q), a
reduction in output by one unit reduces the expected net present value of the

firm by m > 0, where m is increasing in A (see eq. [A3]). Thus, the firm has
an incentive to cut price to preserve m. Price cuts are more likely if the firm
can selectively cut price only to customers with relatively elastic demand.

Finally, with policy-specific intangible capital, intuition suggests that firms
would have additional incentive to cut prices to avoid losing quasi rents on
established business.

Appendix B
Further Details on Data and Estimation
Data used to calculate %FR and the ratio of cumulative paid losses to updated
loss forecasts were Schedule P data provided by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Written premium data and data for the

exogenous variables were obtained from A.M. Best data tapes maintained by
the Center for Research on Risk and Insurance at the University of Pennsylva-
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nia. The NAIC data for individual companies with common ownership were

consolidated to a group basis using A.M. Best group definitions. All groups
or unaffiliated companies with at least $250,000 in net premiums written for
the regression sample year and the prior year were eligible. Observations with

implausibly large values for any of several variables were excluded. The
thresholds used were 10, for the firms' initial and updated loss forecast divided

by earned premiums, the difference between these ratios, and %FR (divided
by 100); and 15, for percent growth (divided by 100) in net or direct general
liability premiums.
Regression diagnostics were calculated for initial specifications using the
SAS "Influence" option (see Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980). A number of
influential observations were identified and excluded, primarily on the basis

of either large studentized residuals (e.g., absolute value greater than 7), large
standardized changes in an estimated coefficient when an observation was
deleted from the sample (e.g., absolute value greater than 1.5), or both. Unless

otherwise noted, these exclusions did not have a strong effect on the key
variables related to the MH and HI hypotheses. The exclusions generally

mitigated positive skewness in the ordinary least squares (OLS) residuals for
the reduced forms. We also estimated some of the equations using logarithms

of the endogenous variables and obtained essentially similar results.
To control for heteroscedasticity when estimating the reduced-form %FR
equation, we assumed that log (u 2) = a + b(1IP) + cR + dM, where Cr2 iS
disturbance variance, P is earned GL premiums (net of reinsurance), R is a
zero-one dummy variable equal to one for reinsurers, and M is a zero-one

dummy variable equal to one for mutuals. We used the logs of the squared
OLS residuals to estimate parameters and calculate appropriate weights for
weighted least squares estimation. This procedure constrains the estimated

variances to be positive. The estimates of b and c were generally positive and

significant; the estimate of d was usually negative and significant. In the %GR
equations, we assumed that disturbance standard deviation was proportional

to the log of lagged GL insurance premiums written. Results using unweighted
data were similar.

We estimated the %GR reduced-form equation for a sample that included
firms that later failed. The estimates produced comparable results, suggesting
that survivor bias is not serious. We also estimated the %GR equation includ-

ing several alternative dummy variables for firms that later exited. The estimated coefficients were generally small and insignificant. This result suggests
that factors leading to firm-specific financial problems, including effects of MH

and HI, were captured by the remaining variables or that rapid growth by
some firms in our sample that subsequently went insolvent was at least par-

tially offset by slow growth for others that were already retrenching.
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